Bolor Lkhaajav | Policy Consultant, Op-Ed Contributor – Arctus Analytics

East Asian state actors – including Russia, Mongolia, China, Japan, DPRK, and South Korea – have been free of direct conflicts with one another since the end of the Cold War. The region’s involvement in multiple wars shaped each country’s foreign policy and a status-quo that kept conflicts at bay. This also includes the Cross-strait relations. 

In recent years, however, rising defense budgets, new levels of partnerships, and changing deterrence dynamics are shaping the region’s security environment. The Russia-North Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, shifts in China’s response to North Korea’s engagement, Japan’s 2025 White Paper, and the US “tariff governance” and burden sharing tactics under President Donald Trump, all mark a shift in the post WWII status-quo. 

New Alliances, Diverging Interests

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its 2024 security pact with North Korea, combined with United States President Donald Trump’s tariff measures, have accelerated changes in East Asia’s geopolitical paradigm. North Korea’s decision to upgrade relations with Russia was indeed a strategic move. On Russia’s part too, Moscow needed a new ally in the region but also on the global stage. This new alliance prompted strategic reassessment in Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul – for different reasons. It also puts Mongolia’s delicate balancing act on trial as well. This partnership challenges the post-Cold War status-quo, and regional states are reacting differently, but mostly to protect their own interests.

It is fair to say that the geopolitical environment would have been different if Russia-DPKR partnership excelled during a peace time under the portend of de-nuclearization of North Korea. Under such circumstances, landlocked countries like Mongolia can also benefit from Ulaanbaatar-Pyongyang relations. For example, between 2015-2016, Mongolia tested rail shipping of 25,000 tons of coal to North Korea’s Rajin port. The opportunity is still there, however, it has always been the case of if and when international climate permits.

As East Asian actors refrain from making irrational decisions, it is highly likely that each state will increase defense and security spending.

While increasing defense spending and military exercises are one thing, acquiring or the discussion to acquire a nuclear weapon as a deterrence is a whole another ball game. In the face of constant North Korea threat, South Korea has considered alternative options, in addition to relying on the American presence. Ex-President of South Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol mentioned “should the country go down that path, its civil nuclear capabilities and delivery systems would allow it to swiftly acquire an operational nuclear force.” 

“Analysis of various surveys and public opinion polls over the past several years shows marked support for a nuclear program. Since 2016, in a regularly conducted opinion poll, between 60 and 70 percent of respondents have expressed support for this option.” Even though Seoul has toned down on this subject, with Trump pushing for burden-sharing (particularly in the case of collective defense mechanisms) and the fresh doubts about the reliability of American support, these subjects may be tabled sooner than later. These endeavors and actions will require withdrawing from the non-nuclear proliferation treaty to acquire nuclear weapons and would fundamentally alter global security architecture. 

These changes, along with rising insecurities of individual states, at some point, will break the Cold War status quo and enter a new era of partnerships.

Reliance on American Presence and Current Discussions

Since taking office in January 2025, US President Donald Trump has yet to release any policy towards its Asian allies. Trump’s “tariff governance” has so far placed a 15 percent tariff rate on Japan and South Korea. Observers and analysts have been skeptical of the US treatment of its Asian allies in the midst of geopolitically challenging times. Moreover, some views that the notion of burden sharing are clear indications of diminution of American direct presence in regional affairs. 

New Jersey Senator Andy Kim stated that Trump’s current policy towards United States East Asian allies does not align with, nor support the security treaties that have been signed post-WWII. Senator Kim emphasized that to South Korea, many of Trump’s actions will be viewed as a disrespect for the partnership. During US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first visit to Asia in July, Rubio re-affirmed US commitment in the Asia-Pacific, but he also highlighted the burden-sharing, “Asia must do more” messages, which has been consistent with Trump’s approach with NATO.

Moreover, the absence of the US in many multilateral mechanisms will bolster other states to increase their cooperation. As trade-dependent countries such as China, Japan and South Korea want to continue the upward trend, changes in the current status quo will harm the global economy at large. The Asian Development Bank recently released Economic Forecasts for Asia and the Pacific July 2025 report.

“Developing Asia and the Pacific’s growth forecasts are cut to 4.7% in 2025 and 4.6% in 2026 from April. Front-loading of exports and solid domestic demand boosted growth in the first quarter of 2025, but a worsened external environment weighs on the region’s outlook.”

Despite these changes, East Asian actors will not neglect soft power mechanisms that they have built since the end of WWII. But this doesn’t mean states won’t allocate financial resources in defense and defense related partnerships either.

On July 29, Japan released the digest version of its 2025 White Paper. Beyond Japan’s local politics, the 2025 White Paper Digest already shows a shift in post-WWII status quo and restoring of security alliances. 

Japan’s Defense Minister Nakatani Gen emphasized that, “I proposed the spirit of One Cooperative Effort Among Nations: Perspective for the Indo-Pacific (OCEAN). I stated that the spirit of OCEAN is grounded in a shared spirit — a collective commitment among defense authorities to restoring the rules-based international order, strengthening accountability, and advancing the international public good through cooperation, openness, inclusivity, and transparency. The spirit of OCEAN underscores the importance of countries sharing common values and interests to take a broad and panoramic view of the Indo-Pacific, to generate synergy through enhanced cooperation and collaboration among their respective initiatives, and to create new values and benefits.”

The larger viewpoint here is that there are changes in the working mechanisms that can impact East Asia as a whole region.

Geopolitical Implications for Mongolia

In response to these new elements, smaller states like Mongolia will need to recalibrate their policies. Mongolia’s geographical configuration will make it difficult to navigate if conflict were to arise. Guided by its National Security Concept (2010), and Foreign Policy Concept (2011), Ulaanbaatar will maintain absence of getting involved and push for peaceful resolution while maintaining its non-nuclear weapons status (NNWS). Mongolia has maintained a policy of non-alignment, a nuclear-weapons-free status, and an emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution.

In 1992, Mongolia declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The declaration itself was an indication of Mongolia’s peaceful foreign policy, and pursuit of a multilateral system that will not only uphold peace but will maintain a player that advocates peace and security of the region and the world.  Given the changing regional geopolitics and global affairs in general, it might be time for Mongolia to upgrade its national security and foreign policy documents. In tabling these concepts, increasing trilateral mechanisms will be crucial.

As part of Mongolia’s multi-pillared foreign policy, Ulaanbaatar will continue to push for peaceful resolutions in both regional and global conflicts. Given the increase of imprudent threats of nuclear warfare, Mongolia felt the need to reiterate its position. In a June 2024 report to the United Nations’ Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Mongolian government highlighted its commitment to maintaining international peace and security. This statement directly touches on Mongolia’s commitment to upholding the NPT commitment (signed in 1969). In 2022, Mongolia joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons to re-affirm Ulaanbaatar’s firm commitment to the nuclear-weapon-free world. 

These new geopolitical paradigms in East Asia are no longer a debate, but rather a conversation on how regional states should react and respond to these fast-moving mechanisms. As far as we can assess, there are changes in alliances and partnerships, and with US commitment in the region being questioned, regional actors will rely on each other more than ever before. These new realignments can alter East Asian security architecture in the near future.

There might be an emergence of a collective defense mechanism in East Asia, but the policy formulation, let alone implementation of such an endeavor will likely create a bloc mentality and this doesn’t quite fit the East Asian actor’s national interests. US President Donald Trump’s meeting with the Russian President Vladimir Putin will have some say in these shifting geopolitical issues but will not have a direct impact on how each state engages with each other.

For Mongolia, the priority will be preserving its ability to engage across different actors while reinforcing multilateral frameworks that discourage bloc polarization. As East Asia’s alignments shift, Ulaanbaatar’s challenge will be to preserve its neutrality without compromising strategic autonomy.